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This essay critically examines a questionable presupposition of contem-
porary science—that science is an instrumental means to human ends 
and as such is a value- neutral project. According to this presupposition, 
the responsibility for the ethical evaluation of science concerns only the 
uses to which science is put by society and thus does not belong properly 
to the scientific profession. This view, which C. P. Snow called “the 
myth of ethical neutrality,” is critiqued along ethical, philosophical, 
and theological axes of analysis. Once we recognize that science is es-
sentially a form of power, it becomes clear that science is morally am-
biguous because the power over nature that science enables contains the 
potential for domination over humanity. From the Christian perspec-
tive, which holds that all worldly power is “fallen,” it is evident that 
science also is in need of being “ransomed” from evil uses and reoriented 
toward the priorities of God’s Kingdom. Accordingly, to be responsible 
science must be accountable to transcendent values and must be in dia-
logue with other disciplines, including ethics, philosophy, and theology.
Science and ValuesTo expose and examine the contemporary presupposition of the value- neutrality of science and its implications, I draw 
from several statements on the relationship between science and 
values as expressed by prominent scientists in the second half of 
the twentieth century whose scientific works have significantly 
impacted society.1
The Division of Labor
To gain leverage on this question of how contemporary science 
views the relationship between science and values, I take as a pivot 
point the view of Albert Einstein on the relationship between sci-
ence and religion. Einstein saw an intimate motivational connec-
tion between religion (as he understood it) and scientific research. 
He maintained, “The cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and 
noblest motive for scientific research.”2 He went so far as to say, 
“In this materialistic age of ours the serious scientific workers are 
the only profoundly religious people.”3
Beyond such esoteric remarks, Einstein saw potential for a fruit-
ful reciprocal relationship between science and religion that could 
overcome a past of mutual suspicion and conflict. The goal of sci-
ence, in his view, is to establish an objective, systematic knowledge 
1. Heather Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value- Free Ideal (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 44–65, shows that the contemporary ideal of the value- 
neutrality of science is largely a product of the post–World War II era.
2. Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Wings Books, 1954), 39.
3. Ibid., 40.
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of what is, namely, the facts about the observable world; this sci-
entific knowledge then “provides us with powerful instruments for 
the achievement of certain ends.” The limit of science appears as 
soon as we introduce the question of value, namely, which ends 
ought we pursue with science- enabled means? In his view, “the 
ultimate goal itself and the longing to reach it must come from 
another source,” for “knowledge of what is does not open the door 
directly to what should be.” What is that other source? Einstein 
concludes, “To make clear these fundamental ends and valuations 
. . . seems to me precisely the most important function which re-
ligion has to perform in the social life of man.”4 In a nutshell, 
Einstein holds that science makes possible the means to do what 
we so choose but is incapable of telling us what we should choose 
to do; for that, we need religion- inspired values. Einstein sums it 
up in a pithy statement: “Science without religion is lame, religion 
without science is blind.”5 In Einstein’s view, the goal of coopera-
tion between scientific means and religious ends is the “free and 
responsible development of the individual, so that he may place 
his powers freely and gladly in the service of all mankind.”6 
Einstein achieved the peaceful coexistence and reciprocal coop-
eration between science and religion via a division of moral labor 
premised upon a demarcation between disciplinary domains that 
categorically dissects fact from value.
Science is the century- old endeavor to bring together by 
means of systematic thought the perceptible phenomena of 




. . . Religion is the age- old endeavor of mankind to become 
clearly and completely conscious of [superpersonal] values 
and goals and constantly to strengthen and extend their 
effect. If one conceives of religion and science according 
to these definitions then a conflict between them appears 
impossible. For science can only ascertain what is, but not 
what should be, and outside of its domain value judgments 
of all kinds remain necessary. Religion, on the other hand, 
deals only with evaluations of human thought and action: 
it cannot justifiably speak of facts and relationships between 
facts. . . . The realms of religion and science in themselves 
are clearly marked off from each other.7
In short, science tells us the facts, religion inspires our values, and 
each is mutually exclusive of the other.8 This fact/value dichotomy 
correlates directly with a means/ends division: Science- discovered 
facts provide a value- neutral means to achieve science- independent 
ends inspired by religious values.9 It is assumed here that one can 
independently evaluate means and ends and that the standards of 
critique that apply to one (scientific methods) are disjointed from 
those applying to the other (human goals). Hence, moral modes 
of evaluation germane to religion are irrelevant to (indeed, inap-
propriate for) judging science as science; likewise, epistemological 
modes of evaluation germane to science are irrelevant to (indeed, 
inappropriate for) judging religion as religion. The two meet only 
7. Ibid., 44–45.
8. See also Einstein, “Religion and Science: Irreconcilable?” in Ideas and Opinions.
9. On the connection between the fact/value dichotomy and the means/ends division, 
see Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
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in the practical endeavor, where the sole judgment to be made is 
whether the scientific instruments are efficient and effective means 
for the chosen ends.
Physicist Richard Feynman likewise performed a dissection of 
the scientific and the ethical along a parallel fact/value line. Feyn-
man claimed that “science and moral questions are independent” 
on the grounds that “it is impossible to decide moral questions 
[‘Should I do this?’] by the scientific technique,” which can answer 
only questions of the form, “If I do this what will happen?”10 It 
is true that empirical science itself cannot decide our moral val-
ues (“ultimately we have to decide,” as Feynman puts it). From 
the claim that questions of values cannot be decided by scientific 
method, however, it does not follow logically that science and val-
ues are necessarily independent. For, as will be argued below, it 
may well be that science has already decided (implicitly) in favor 
of certain values as the very essence of its practice.
Einstein’s view of the mutual independence of science and re-
ligion, and thus of the value- neutrality of science, is not simply an 
historical artifact. Indeed, the late Stephen Jay Gould articulated 
this view more recently under the acronym NOMA: Science and 
religion constitute “non- overlapping magisteria.”11 Gould defines 
this notion as follows: “Each domain of inquiry frames its own 
rules and admissible questions and sets its own criteria for judg-
ment and resolution. These accepted standards, and the procedures 
developed for debating and resolving legitimate issues, define 
the magisterium—or teaching authority—of any given realm.”12 
10. Richard P. Feynman, The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen- Scientist (Read-
ing, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1998), 44, 46.
11. Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New 
York: Ballantine, 1999).
12. Gould, Rocks of Ages, 52–53.
Applying this definition to science and religion, Gould demarcates 
science as the domain of inquiry whose aim is the description and 
explanation of “the factual construction of nature” and whose cri-
terion of judgment is successful experience (i.e., if the experiment 
works, if the theory explains, then the science is good).13 Religion 
and ethics constitute a separate domain of inquiry whose aim is 
the value and meaning of life.14 While Gould maintains that the 
domains of science and religion “hold equal worth and necessary 
status for any complete human life,” nonetheless these respective 
domains are logically independent and methodologically distinct.15
Now, recognizing that Einstein was pantheistic (à la Spinoza) 
and Gould was agnostic, one might think that such a view of sci-
ence and religion is peculiar to nontheists. Not so. Jean Pond, 
a biologist and a Christian, has taken up Gould’s NOMA view 
and endorsed it from a Christian perspective. She writes, echoing 
Gould:
Science and theology are different ways of acquiring differ-
ent kinds of truths about the world. Science and theology 
differ in their areas of inquiry and in the methods they use. 
. . . Science seeks an understanding of the physical or natural 
world, whereas theology seeks the fullest possible knowledge 
of God’s actions in human history and God’s purpose for 
our own lives.16
13. Ibid., 54.
14. Gould, like Einstein, bases separation of science and religion on a fact/value (or 
“is- ought”) dichotomy. For his part, Gould acknowledges that this dichotomy is philo-
sophically dubious but proceeds to utilize it anyway—see Gould, Rocks of Ages, 55–57.
15. Ibid., 58–59.
16. Jean Pond, “Independence: Mutual Humility in the Relationship between Science 
& Christian Theology,” in Science and Christianity: Four Views, ed. Richard F. Carlson 
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 81. Pond’s demarcation of science 
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Pond concludes, concurring with Gould and Einstein, that the 
NOMA approach resolves conflict between science and religion: 
“If we maintain an independence between science and theology, if 
we allow each the proper authority within its own field, many of 
these problems are avoided.”17
While avoiding conflict between science and religion is a desir-
able goal, the ethical implications of NOMA are what concern us 
here. According to NOMA, science and religion, facts and val-
ues, are distinct domains, each having its own methods for how to 
practice, rules for what is permissible, and criteria for what counts 
as good. And because these mutually independent domains are 
equal in status, it would be inappropriate either to apply the meth-
ods of science to religion and ethics or to apply the rules of religion 
and criteria of ethics to the practice of science. In this way, scien-
tific practice is free, not only from ecclesiastical encroachment but 
also from accountability to any values that originate in any domain 
outside science: Science as such is autonomous, accountable only 
to its own rules. Now, it may be that many scientists do not con-
sciously practice their profession according to a strict dichotomy 
between scientific methods and human values. Still, NOMA’s de-
marcation of science and religion/ethics into mutually indepen-
dent domains does effectively rationalize such a dichotomy.
from theology is implicitly premised on a distinction between physical nature and 
human history—science can be cleaved from theology because science deals with 
physical nature but God acts in human history. This distinction is dubious, both scien-
tifically and theologically. According to the theory of evolution, which Pond endorses, 
human history is bound up with natural history. Thus, while NOMA must exclude 
God from natural history, Pond’s distinction would leave human evolution open to 
divine action. And according to the witness of scripture, God has acted in human his-
tory by manipulating physical nature—most notably, from a Christian perspective, in 
Jesus Christ, in whom God assumed bodily form in the created order. Pond’s distinc-
tion thus calls into question the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation.
17. Pond, “Independence,” 103.
Going forward, I am concerned primarily with the ethical im-
plications for scientific practice of the division of moral labor be-
tween scientific means and religious ends. I will thus bracket, for 
the purpose of this essay, the question of whether science and reli-
gion are actually as distinct in their respective methods as NOMA 
claims. Recent work on science and religion has pointed to signifi-
cant parallels between scientific methods and theological methods 
concerning the role of paradigms, use of models, testing/selection 
of theories, and so on, contrary to the NOMA thesis.18
The Myth of Neutrality
The so- called value- independence of science exemplifies the at-
titude that C. P. Snow called the “myth of the ethical neutrality 
of science.” Snow, who rejected the myth, describes it as follows:
Whether [scientists] like it or not, what they do is of critical 
importance for the human race. Intellectually, [science] has 
transformed the climate of our time. Socially, it will decide 
whether we live or die, and how we live or die. It holds deci-
sive powers for good and evil. That is the situation in which 
the scientists find themselves. They may not have asked for 
it, or only have asked for it in part, but they cannot escape it. 
. . . There is of course one way to contract out. . . . It consists 
of the invention of categories—or, if you like, of the division 
of moral labor. That is, the scientists who want to contract 
out say we produce the tools. We stop there. It is for you, 
the rest of the world, the politicians, to say how the tools 
are used. The tools may be used for purposes which most of 
18. See Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San 
Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 106–36, and Alister E. McGrath, Science 
and Religion: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 144–76.
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us would regard as bad. If so, we are sorry. But as scientists, 
that is no concern of ours. This is the doctrine of the ethical 
neutrality of science.19
Erecting disciplinary boundaries along a sharp fact/value dichot-
omy, as Einstein outlined and Gould affirmed, effectively frees 
scientific practice from the yoke of moral reflection. For, consider: 
If science per se is about only facts, then good science is to be 
judged solely by professionally defined standards and criteria that 
measure only the correctness and accuracy of the methods used 
for ascertaining and explaining the facts; thus, to do good science 
one need not be burdened with questions of the value of one’s re-
search, either the moral permissibility of one’s methods or the so-
cial implications of one’s conclusions. It is a short step from such 
thinking to the myth that good science is always morally innocent: 
If one’s responsibility as a scientist is circumscribed by narrowly 
defined professional standards and criteria of success, and hence 
scientific research per se is not accountable to moral standards or 
social criteria, then it must be that the methods and content of 
one’s science are ethically neutral—that is, science is innocent in-
sofar as and to the extent that it satisfies those professional stan-
dards and criteria and is corrupted only through evil uses by social 
choices. Implicit in this attitude is a division of moral labor be-
tween science and all other spheres of human responsibility: Sci-
ence is an ethically neutral and thus professionally autonomous 
19. C. P. Snow, “The Moral Un- Neutrality of Science,” in The New Scientist: Essays on 
the Methods and Values of Modern Science, ed. P. C. Obler and H. A. Estrin (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1962), 128–29, original emphasis. See also Roberta M. 
Berry, “Eugenics after the Holocaust: The Limits of Reproductive Rights,” in Human-
ity at the Limit: The Impact of the Holocaust Experience on Christians and Jews (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2000).
sphere, within which scientists are to be concerned only with the 
question of means, that is, the production of knowledge and tech-
nique, while the question of ends or values, that is, how knowledge 
and technique are to be used, falls to other spheres within society.
This attitude is not merely harmless theorizing. Many atomic 
physicists involved in the Manhattan Project did accept, and some 
genetic scientists involved in the Human Genome Project have 
since accepted, the myth of ethical neutrality. The consequent divi-
sion of moral labor in the practical attitudes of scientists manifests 
itself in various divisions—pure versus applied science, scientist as 
researcher versus scientist as citizen, science versus democracy—
each of which implicitly presupposes some form of the fact/value 
dichotomy.
Even after Hiroshima, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific 
director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory during the Man-
hattan Project, held to such a division of moral labor. When asked 
several years later to give an account of his participation on the 
scientific panel that advised President Truman’s Interim Com-
mittee on how to use the atomic bomb and which cities to target, 
Oppenheimer divorced his expert advice from moral responsibility 
for the ultimate decision: “What was expected of this committee 
of experts was primarily a technical opinion on new questions,” a 
task that presumably carried no further responsibility than merely 
being factually accurate in one’s predictions.20 It’s not that Op-
penheimer saw no connection between the physicists’ work and 
20. Quoted in Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the 
Atomic Scientists (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace, 1958), 209. In the words of Ar-
thur H. Compton, another member of the expert committee, the panel gave a “tech-
nical reply to a technical question” (ibid., 182). Realize that the scientific panel was 
estimating the range of destruction and the number of persons killed by the bomb and 
recommending a target city that would maximize those effects.
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the destruction wrought by the bomb. He did, and he saw atomic 
scientists themselves as having lost their innocence as a result. 
However, he saw all of this as having no implication for how sci-
entific research itself is to be done. He viewed moral reflection 
on values as incompatible with the very practice of science itself, 
which is aimed at facts. Answering questions of means and asking 
questions of ends, he says, are mutually exclusive (or “complemen-
tary”); and this exclusivity limits the scientist’s sphere of profes-
sional responsibility to just the facts. Oppenheimer writes:
No scientist can hope to evaluate what his studies, his re-
searches, his experiments may in the end produce for his fel-
low men, except in one respect—if they are sound, they will 
produce knowledge. . . . The true responsibility of a scientist, 
as we all know, is to the integrity and vigor of his science. 
. . . If the professional pursuit of science makes good scien-
tists . . . it is doing a great deal, and all that we may rightly 
ask of it.21
The upshot of the fact/value dichotomy for Oppenheimer is a divi-
sion between the scientist as researcher in the laboratory and the 
scientist as citizen in society, which comprise two “complemen-
tary” aspects of one person who has separate spheres of responsi-
bility but whose first responsibility is always to science.22
Edward Teller, who earned the epithet “father of the hydro-
gen bomb,” also divided the scientist’s work ethic from the social 
21. J. Robert Oppenheimer, “Physics in the Contemporary World,” in The Open Mind 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), 88, 90–1, 92–3.
22. For a fuller examination of Oppenheimer’s views on the responsibility of the sci-
entist, see S. S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the 
Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
impact of scientific research. In a July 1945 letter to physicist Leó 
Szilárd, who served as the moral conscience of the atomic science 
community, Teller released scientists from responsibility for any 
military- political decision to drop the atomic bomb (to which he 
objected) even before Hiroshima. Teller wrote:
The accident that we worked out this dreadful thing should 
not give us the responsibility of having a voice in how it is 
to be used. This responsibility must in the end be shifted 
to the people as a whole and that can be done only by mak-
ing the facts known. This is the only cause for which I feel 
entitled in doing something: the necessary lifting of the 
secrecy at least as far as the broad issues of our work are 
concerned.23
After the war, fearing domination from a totalitarian Russia, he 
held that the imperatives of absolute freedom of research and patri-
otic duty compelled the atomic scientist to employ his or her tech-
nical expertise in pursuit of nuclear physics to its utmost potential 
for developing both energy and weapons. It is not that he felt the 
scientist had no responsibility toward humanity; he did. Scientists, 
Teller felt, should at least promote democracy (for the sake of both 
humanity and science). But this should not in any way encumber 
the unimpeachable imperative and unrestricted freedom of scien-
tific research.24 Decades later, just before the costly and precarious 
nuclear arms race collapsed under its own weight, Teller held to 
23. Quoted in Tamara L. Roleff, ed., The Atom Bomb (San Diego, Calif.: Greenhaven 
Press, 2000), 205.
24. Edward Teller, “Atomic Scientists Have Two Responsibilities,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (December 1947): 354–55.
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his original view that the scientist is responsible only for increas-
ing and disseminating knowledge without limit; responsibility for 
answering questions about the value and uses of science in a dem-
ocratic society, in his view, falls to the general public:
Now as then, my argument is for knowledge and against 
ignorance. Now as then, I offer no detailed proposals as to 
how the knowledge, once acquired, should be used. Scien-
tists have the responsibility to make knowledge available and 
to explain its possible applications. The decision as to which 
uses should be adopted, now as then, should belong to the 
entire community. That is indeed the main principle on 
which a democratic society rests.25
This historical recollection aims not at condemning particular 
scientists for the hard choices they made in complex and ambigu-
ous circumstances, but rather at uncovering and critiquing the at-
titudes by which those scientists understood themselves and their 
research in relation to moral ends. An honest history teaches that 
a division of moral labor underwritten by a fact/value dichotomy 
that insulates science from external critique and disburdens the 
scientist of moral responsibility for the uses of research tends to 
cultivate a cavalier attitude toward social concerns.26 When faced 
with moral questions about the atomic bomb during the last 
days of the Manhattan Project, Enrico Fermi, who built the first 
25. From Edward Teller, Better a Shield Than a Sword, excerpted in Roleff, The Atom 
Bomb, 212.
26. There were exceptions in the Manhattan Project, in particular Leó Szilárd, who 
functioned as the moral conscience of the atomic scientists. Few were swayed by his 
arguments and efforts, however. See Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 171–90.
chain- reacting atomic pile, was known to reply: “Don’t bother 
me with your conscientious scruples! After all, the thing’s superb 
physics!”27 And Oppenheimer, amid Cold War questioning of his 
political loyalty, said of the hydrogen bomb once the Korean War 
had begun, “It is my judgment in these things that when you see 
something that is technically sweet you go ahead and do it and 
you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your 
technical success.”28 (To gauge the moral callousness of such an 
attitude, simply imagine such words in the mouth of Nazi SS phy-
sician Dr. Josef Mengele regarding his eugenic studies of twins at 
Auschwitz: “Don’t bother me with your conscientious scruples! 
After all, it’s superb biology!”)
Such an attitude was not simply a creature of the Cold War era 
but also appeared in the context of the Human Genome Project. 
Walter Gilbert, who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for devel-
oping novel techniques of DNA sequencing, wishes to separate 
the potentially negative social impacts of molecular genetics from 
the mandate of scientists to pursue knowledge unencumbered by 
moral debate. Gilbert, tacitly bracketing out the social aims that 
led the U.S. government to fund the “big science” project in the 
first place, casts the Human Genome Project as a pure “science for 
knowledge’s sake” endeavor of discovery that evidently needs no 
external justification. Gilbert writes:
To work out our DNA sequence is to achieve a historic step 
forward in knowledge. . . . The human genome project can 
be viewed as a purely technological effort to obtain the DNA 
sequence, put it into a computer data base, and study it. . . . 
27. Quoted in Jungk, 202.
28. Quoted in Ibid., 296.
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The genome project is an application of scientific technology 
to produce a certain end—the information content of the 
genome.29
Correspondingly, though aware of the possible social problems 
created by this new knowledge, Gilbert sees these potential im-
pacts as outside the scope of the Human Genome Project, as 
problems concerning the general public, and not the proper re-
sponsibility of science itself: “Gene typing and genetic mapping 
could also have very strong social effects. However, the problems 
posed by the knowledge are not insurmountable and can be dealt 
with in a democratic society.”30 Because the human genome is 
the self- justifying holy grail of biological science, and because it 
is society’s responsibility to answer the hard questions, moral val-
ues and social criteria should not constrain genetic research and, 
hence, potentially harmful impacts should pose no obstacles to 
discovery.
James D. Watson, codiscoverer of the double- helical struc-
ture of DNA and former chief of the NIH’s National Human 
Genome Research Institute, is aware of the recent eugenic past 
of human genetics in the Western democracies and sensitive to 
the social- ethical implications of genomic research and thus has 
advocated for legal protection of personal genomic information. 
Watson, however, appears to be motivated more by the desire to 
protect science from the backlash of a fearful society than by the 
desire to protect society from harmful uses of science: “The ac-
quisition of human DNA information has already begun to pose 
29. Walter Gilbert, “A Vision of the Grail,” in The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social 
Issues in the Human Genome Project, ed. D. Kevles and L. Hood (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 83, 90, 92.
30. Gilbert, “A Vision of the Grail,” 95.
serious ethical problems. . . . We need to explore the social impli-
cations of human genome research and figure out some protection 
for people’s privacy so that these fears do not sabotage the entire 
project.”31 It thus seems that, as Watson sees it, the point of at-
tending to the social implications of scientific research through 
public policy is to maintain the professional autonomy of scientific 
research.
Beyond the Myth
The upshot of the myth of ethical neutrality and the correspond-
ing division of moral labor is the insulation of science per se from 
moral critique, the creation of a domain of action within which 
scientists may work without moral ambiguity and thus with pro-
fessional autonomy. This view of the value- neutrality and profes-
sional autonomy of science, which is widely held among scientists, 
is beginning to be challenged from within the scientific profes-
sion.32 My aim in this essay is to critique these twinned claims 
along four axes of analysis: ethical, epistemological, ontological, 
and theological. I will consider science as the practice of a profes-
sion, as the pursuit of knowledge, and as a form of power. Each 
axis of analysis, from its own angle, will reveal an axiological di-
mension of science.33 The first two angles of critique—ethical and 
epistemological—will, for the most part, retrace familiar ground 
and thus will not delve into detail. The third and fourth angles 
of critique—ontological and theological—will cover new ground. 
31. James D. Watson, “A Personal View of the Project,” in Code of Codes, 172–73.
32. For example, Kristen K. Intemann and Immaculado de Melo- Martin, “Regulat-
ing Scientific Research: Should Scientists Be Left Alone?” The FASEB Journal 22, no. 
3 (2008): 654–58.
33. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the possible interdependency be-
tween these respective axiological dimensions of science.
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Beginning from the ontological analysis of science as power, I will 
establish a vantage point from we can ethically assess the scientific 
pursuit within the horizon of Christian faith.34
Science and Values: Ethical Critique
Professional Ethics
From the perspective of science as a professional practice, the divi-
sion of moral labor is suspect; it ignores the institutional entangle-
ment of science in society and the financial dependence of science 
on society, which have become inescapable aspects of the actual 
practice of contemporary science.35 Kristin Shrader- Frechette has 
developed a “trustee model” that sets the epistemological pursuit 
of science in the context of the social responsibility of the special-
ized professions. Because scientific researchers constitute a profes-
sional class that receives special benefits from society—education, 
training, and resources—there is an implied or tacit contract that 
obligates scientists to do research to promote scientific knowledge 
and to be a wise steward of that knowledge for the public good. 
Because of their specialized training, which is afforded to a privi-
leged few in society, scientists have a near monopoly on special-
ized knowledge upon which society depends. This monopoly gives 
scientists a power over society at large and, hence, a corresponding 
34. Robert Proctor, Value- Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), also challenges the value- neutrality of 
science by analyzing science as a form of power, but from a secular perspective. 
35. See Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly, The Many Faces of Science: An Introduction 
to Scientists, Values & Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), and Douglas 
Allchin, “Values in Science and in Science Education,” in International Handbook of 
Science Education, ed. B. J. Fraser and K. G. Tobin (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1988), 2:1083–92.
social responsibility: “Along with specialized knowledge, power 
and benefits . . . come special responsibilities.”36 Society thus “en-
trusts” science with the pursuit of knowledge for the good of so-
ciety as a whole and not just for science as a self- contained and 
self- justifying endeavor.
William May has articulated a similar view with regard to pro-
fessional responsibility.
Why do professionals owe service to the common good? . . . 
Normally, the state licenses them. The society expects pro-
fessionals to state publicly their own standards of excellence, 
to conform to those standards individually, and to enforce 
them upon colleagues within the guild. Further, modern 
professionals wield a public power that vastly exceeds that 
of their predecessors in the professions. What they do today 
fatefully affects human flourishing. Professionals have even 
less reason than their predecessors to construe their power in 
purely private, entrepreneurial terms.37
May’s observation concerning professional standards adds an im-
portant point. The licensing process in consulting professions such 
as medicine, law, and accounting both implies the act of trust that 
society makes in permitting the professional to practice and iden-
tifies the basis of that trust: the ethical accountability of each pro-
fession to public criteria that not only reflect the internal standards 
of competent practice peculiar to the professions but also project 
36. Kristin Shrader- Frechette, Ethics of Scientific Research (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1994), 25.
37. William F. May, Beleaguered Rulers: The Public Obligation of the Professional (Louis-
ville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 21.
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the societal aim of the common good that is the very reason for 
the professions’ existence. The consulting professions, practiced 
properly, thus include an essential sense of fiduciary responsibility, 
which reflects the fact that certain aspects of the common good 
have been entrusted to specialized professionals on behalf of gen-
eral society. Historically, the scholarly professions, including the 
sciences, have not been subject to public licensure.38 Perhaps the 
institution of a (voluntary) public license for scientific research—
say, a “Certified Public Scientist” designation administered by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science—might 
mitigate the divorce of research objectives from public goals and 
stimulate a sense of fiduciary responsibility to the common good 
in scientific practice.
Christian Ethics
The division of moral labor in professional practice is suspect also, 
and especially, from a Christian ethical perspective. Consider the 
“two office” or “two vocation” version of “two kingdom” ethics, 
which the Protestant tradition has emphasized. According to this 
view, every lay Christian has two callings: the common calling of 
all believers to serve brothers and sisters within the church and a 
special calling of each one to serve neighbors within society by the 
practice of a profession or trade or by holding civic office. No call-
ing is more “holy” or “worthy” than another, for all are ordained 
by God, such that to fulfill one’s professional duty is to render 
obedience to God. This, in itself, is not problematic. The problem 
surfaces when we inquire about the ethical standards that apply to 
38. On the similarities and differences between the consulting professions and the 
research professions, see Michael D. Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth Publishing, 1981), 7–11.
these respective vocations.39 Thus, the “two vocation” view holds 
that science, one of the specialized professions, may be practiced 
as a Christian vocation. Okay so far. Now suppose we were to 
adopt the division of moral labor and apply it to scientific research 
as a Christian vocation. This division (à la NOMA) would imply 
that a Christian who practices her profession properly as a scien-
tist does not consider moral ends or religious values in the context 
of her scientific research but does her scientific research according 
only to the standards proper to science as such.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer rejected a division of moral labor that 
would narrowly circumscribe one’s Christian duty within the pri-
vate sphere and advance an ethic foreign to the gospel for one’s 
professional vocation in the public arena. He insisted that the 
Christian vocation and its particular, gospel- rooted ethic must 
encompass the whole of life: “Vocation is responsibility and re-
sponsibility is a total response of the whole man to the whole of 
reality; for this very reason there can be no petty and pedantic 
restricting of one’s interests to one’s professional duties in the nar-
rowest sense. Any such restriction would be irresponsibility.”40 In 
this same spirit, Duane Friesen has argued that there can be no 
appeal to professional specialty as a buffer from accountability to 
criteria and responsibility for ends that transcend one’s vocational 
domain:
If we are to approach a profession from a Christian point of 
view, we need a place to stand, a framework for assessment 
39. Concerning the Protestant idea of Christian vocation and the problem of the 
ethical standard for public vocation, see Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Louis-
ville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1950), 153–90.
40. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Macmillian, 1955), 254.
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that transcends both the standards of competence provided 
by a profession as well as our own personal standards of suc-
cess and satisfaction. Without that transcendent framework, 
the workspace becomes an autonomous sphere of life no 
longer subject to interpretation within a world created and 
sustained by God. The workspace can then easily become 
an occasion for the expression of the demonic rather than 
service to the neighbor or the common good.41
What Friesen writes concerning the professions in general applies 
to science in particular: From a Christian perspective, the inter-
nal standards of competent science are relevant but insufficient for 
practicing science as a vocational service to society in accord with 
Christian duty.
The view of Jean Pond, cited above, illustrates the point. 
Defending the mutual independence of science and theology 
(NOMA) from a Christian perspective, she addresses a common 
objection: “Christians who maintain an independence between sci-
ence and faith are sometimes accused of being ‘bifurcated’ people. 
That is, our lives are compartmentalized. The religion compart-
ment operates on Sunday—in church—but on Monday the sci-
ence compartment takes over as work resumes in the laboratory.”42 
Pond, a biologist, answers this objection not by refuting compart-
mentalization but by observing that the Sunday/Monday divide 
is common to all Christians in specialized professions: “I’ve never 
understood why a job in science should be much different than 
a job in, say, major league baseball. We operate according to the 
41. Duane K. Friesen, Artists, Citizens, Philosophers: Seeking the Peace of the City; An 
Anabaptist Theology of Culture (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 2000), 219.
42. Pond, “Independence,” 90.
commonly accepted rules of science just as baseball players have a 
set of rules in baseball.”43 That compartmentalization is common 
practice, however, is precisely the problem; that any specialized 
profession, science included, should understand itself as simply 
operating by “its own rules” is inadequate as a Christian perspec-
tive of professional practice.
The ethical critique of the division of moral labor may be stated 
more generally. As H. R. Niebuhr pointed out, it is only by an ex-
ercise of intellectual abstraction that one can claim that ethics and 
values constitute a demarcated domain and thus a peculiar voca-
tion, a specialized activity separable from other human activities. 
Existentially, ethics by way of value choices pervades all human 
activities. Science, like all human activities, therefore, is morally 
ordered; the only question is what that moral ordering is. Niebuhr 
writes:
The question the moralist raises is not whether such sci-
ence is in conflict with morality, but whether such science 
is adequately aware of its own moral character and whether 
scientists are sufficiently philosophic or comprehensive in 
their outlook so as to be able to order their activity as moral 
within the whole complex of human personal activities.44
Niebuhr cites commitment to knowledge as a good, the discipline 
of self- criticism, and faithfulness in truth telling as characteristics 
of the moral ordering of science.
43. Ibid., 90–91.
44. H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1960), 136.
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Science, Values, and Power: Philosophical Critique
Epistemology of Science: Science as Knowledge
The fact/value dichotomy underlying the division of moral labor 
is suspect also from an epistemological perspective. The fact/value 
dichotomy finds its philosophical sources in empiricism, which, 
following the eighteenth- century philosopher David Hume, takes 
the “is- ought” distinction as a categorical truth. Philosophy of 
science over the second half of the twentieth century thoroughly 
criticized and almost uniformly rejected strict empiricism and its 
dogmas, whether of the positivist or falsificationist variety, and 
the associated fact/value dichotomy.45 In short, any epistemol-
ogy that would be descriptively accurate of both the history and 
contemporary practice of science must acknowledge that scien-
tific methodology is value- structured to at least some degree. This 
axiological aspect of science appears in several interrelated forms: 
the “theory- ladenness” of observation, the logical analysis of “cru-
cial experiments,” the underdetermination of theory by evidence, 
and, consequently, the inevitable role of cognitive values in theory 
choice.46 While the value- structure of scientific methodology need 
not undermine the epistemological objectivity of scientific theo-
45. On the background, and collapse, of the fact/value dichotomy, see Putnam, The 
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 7–45.
46. See Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), Willard V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), Norwood Russell Hanson, Per-
ception and Discovery (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co., 1969), Michael Po-
lanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post- Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), and W. H. Newton- Smith, The Ratio-
nality of Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981).
ries, nonetheless the acceptance of any particular theory in science 
does imply the prior (or concurrent) acceptance of certain value 
judgments.47
This epistemological critique has been augmented by socio-
logical inquiry that has exhibited the interrelation of epistemol-
ogy and sociology in science. Perhaps the most common form of 
the myth of ethical neutrality is the dichotomy of “pure versus 
applied” science, where “pure” science is value- neutral because 
it pursues knowledge for its own sake while “applied” science is 
value- structured because of the explicit social, economic, or politi-
cal aims and interests of the institutional and corporate contexts in 
which it gets done. The notion of “pure” science, however, is disin-
genuous from the beginning, not only because of the institutional 
relationships of science to social sources of support already noted 
but also because so- called pure science has its own normative soci-
ology—an institutionally organized, value- structured social system 
(e.g., the peer- review process)—that is integral to science being a 
knowledge- seeking enterprise.48 Robert Merton characterized the 
“ethos” of science not as value- neutral but rather as embodying 
47. I thus concur with the late Ernan McMullin that the value- structure of science 
does not necessarily militate against objectivity in science. See McMullin’s essays, 
“Values in Science,” Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (2003): 3–28, 
and “The Shaping of Scientific Rationality: Construction and Constraint,” in Con-
struction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Rationality, ed. E. McMullin (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 1–47. See also my own essays, 
“Formalism, Ontology, and Methodology in Bohmian Mechanics,” Foundations of 
Science 8, no. 2 (2003): 109–72, and “Underdetermination, Realism, and Theory Ap-
praisal: An Epistemological Reflection on Quantum Mechanics,” Foundations of Phys-
ics 35, no. 4 (2005) 669–95.
48. See Henry H. Bauer, Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method (Ur-
bana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1992), and Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific 
Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992).
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four norms—universalism, communalism, disinterestedness, and 
organized skepticism—that link together the value- structured so-
ciology of the scientific profession and the knowledge- seeking aim 
of the scientific pursuit.49
Ontology of Science: Science as Power
The philosophical critique of the value- neutrality of science goes 
deeper than epistemology. For, ontologically, science is a form of 
power of control exercised over, and by means of, the capacities 
of nature. The exercise of the power of control, scientific and oth-
erwise, is never morally neutral because it always presupposes one’s 
right to do so. And, as E. A. Burtt emphasized, such unreflective 
presupposition of right and exercise of power of control in science 
tacitly reflects underlying value commitments regarding scientific 
knowledge that are unconsciously and uncritically adopted from 
one’s historical and social setting.50 
Unlike technology, which manipulates previously known 
potentialities, moreover, science is the power of creating new 
49. Robert K. Merton, “The Ethos of Science,” in On Social Structure and Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
50. E. A. Burtt, “The Value Presuppositions of Science,” in The New Scientist, 259: 
“We tend to assume that science will continue to be what it has come to be, and will 
continue as before to employ its familiar presuppositions and methods; the problem of 
avoiding destruction through science is, we think, the problem of securing wise moral 
control over the applications of scientific discovery that affect human life for weal or 
woe. . . . My major contention will be that the very theoretical foundations of science 
as well as its practical applications reflect certain value- commitments of which we are 
largely unaware. . . . In the course of this analysis I shall try to show that our zealous 
endeavor to create a “value- free” science—which seems so essential a requirement of 
objective scientific method—has meant simply that the values dominating our think-
ing have retired to the arena of our underlying assumptions, where they can maintain 
themselves against critical appraisal by being so completely taken for granted that no 
one’s questioning attention is focused upon them.”
technologies, new ways of controlling—intervening in and ma-
nipulating—the capacities of nature.51 Science brings into exis-
tence new possibilities for human action, both good and evil, and 
thereby effectively chooses not for itself alone but for all human-
ity by making the realization of certain human choices possible 
in the first place. Thus, the question of the values or ends of sci-
ence is implicit already even in so- called pure research. Science, 
because it is a form of power of control, is value- structured by its 
very essence and not only because of its consequences. The fact/
value dichotomy, therefore, fundamentally misunderstands the 
nature of the scientific endeavor: Science is neither a disembodied 
collection of knowledge claims nor an abstract method or proce-
dure, but a web of concretized beliefs and embodied practices that 
is both enabled by and dominant over, both servant and master 
of, nature.52 Hence, the myth of ethical neutrality is a nonstarter. 
Here, Francis Bacon is a better reference point than David Hume 
for understanding science: In science, Bacon noted at the begin-
ning of The New Organon, “Human knowledge and human power 
meet in one.”53
Even Einstein seems to have failed to realize fully the endur-
ing lesson of the Manhattan Project. In the wake of Hiroshima 
Einstein proclaimed a duty of scientists to realize actively the aim 
of peace,54 yet at the same time he told his young assistant: “Yes, 
51. Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), famously argued for scientific realism on the basis of the power of sci-
ence to increase our control over nature through the development of new interventions 
into the capacities of nature.
52. See Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, and Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.
53. Francis Bacon, The New Organon (New York: Macmillian, 1960), 39.
54. Einstein, “A Message to Intellectuals,” in Ideas and Opinions, 148: “We scientists, 
whose tragic destination has been to help in making the methods of annihilation more 
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now we have to divide up our time like that, between politics and 
our equations. But to me our equations are far more important, 
for politics are only a matter for present concern. A mathematical 
equation stands forever.”55 Nuclear physics, though, for all practi-
cal purposes did change politics forever; for knowledge confers 
power of control, and such power and the moral- political question 
of its use endure as long as the knowledge is preserved. The advent 
of knowledge of nuclear fission and the production of the atomic 
bomb set before all humanity a dilemma it previously did not have, 
it did not knowingly choose, and for which it was unprepared, 
a dilemma that has foreclosed the future possibility of a world 
order over which nuclear holocaust and nuclear terror do not loom 
as menacing threats. Until we destroy our equations by destroy-
ing ourselves (perhaps, tragically and ironically, through the very 
use of such knowledge), nuclear weapons will remain a permanent 
scientific- technological achievement with which, at least for the 
foreseeable future, every global politics must negotiate.56
The sequencing and mapping of the human genome, too, will 
cast a long shadow over the possibilities and choices of future gen-
erations. Instead of whether the next generation will have a future, 
however, the political question to be negotiated will be in whose 
image the next generation is to be made and who is to decide. We 
are no better prepared for such dilemmas than we were for those 
foisted upon us by the atomic bomb.57 We have seen a fictional 
gruesome and more effective, must consider it our solemn and transcendent duty to do 
all in our power in preventing these weapons from being used for the brutal purpose 
for which they were invented. What task could possibly be more important for us? 
What social aim could be closer to our hearts.”
55. Quoted in Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 249.
56. See Walter M. Miller Jr., A Canticle for Leibowitz (New York: Bantam Books, 
1959).
57. See Berry, “Eugenics after the Holocaust.”
preview of our eugenic future in the film Gattaca—a society di-
vided by genetic endowment, created not by state coercion but by 
parental choice via in vitro fertilization and embryonic genetic se-
lection. We also get a representative sample of our eugenic future 
in the ongoing practice of eugenic abortion by parental choice. The 
ready availability and normalized use of prenatal diagnostic tests 
for inherited diseases such as Tay- Sachs and Down Syndrome 
prior to the development of complementary therapeutic capabili-
ties has opened up the (assuredly unintended) possibility of such 
technology being employed clinically in the service of the elective 
abortion of children diagnosed in utero with “genetic diseases,” a 
possibility that has thus burdened medical professionals and ex-
pecting parents with new and profound moral dilemmas.
Any scientific achievement that either opens or forecloses sig-
nificant possibilities for human life and community to flourish or 
decay already constitutes a moral choice that implies an enduring 
responsibility of which the scientist cannot disburden himself or 
herself by simply invoking a division of moral labor and saying, 
“That’s not my business.” Consider the case of prenatal genetic 
diagnosis. While the researchers who develop these capabilities 
are themselves not culpable for (and may well be greatly troubled 
by) eugenic abortions based on prenatal genetic tests, they are 
responsible (at least in part, especially given the present legal re-
gime of liberal abortion rights) for creating a situation in which 
the realization of such “reproductive choices” is made possible by 
medical technology. Whereas culpability may end with conscious 
intention and foreseeable consequences, responsibility does not. 
This, of course, was the implicit message of Mary Shelley’s Fran-
kenstein: Dr. Frankenstein remains responsible for the “monster” 
he has created, whether or not he intended his creature to use its 
powers for destruction. Thus, as I see it, the same researchers who 
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develop prenatal genetic diagnostics have an ongoing responsibil-
ity to both pursue complementary therapeutic capabilities and se-
cure restrictions on the use of such diagnostics in the meantime.58
As Richard Bube writes, moreover, because “every advance with 
the potentiality for good has a potentiality for evil that is probably 
proportional to the good,” this is a responsibility that scientists 
must consider from the beginning of their research, and not only 
at the end: “Since scientists are the producers of the potentiality for 
good or evil, their responsibility does not begin only when the po-
tentiality has been brought into existence, but it begins back when 
the potentiality is still only an unrealized speculation.”59 This leads 
Bube to pose the following test question for responsible science: 
“If a scientist would not approve the use of a process or device if 
developed, shouldn’t he refuse to work on its development?” One 
might counter that it is impossible for scientists to actually know 
the practical potential of scientific research, for good or evil, at the 
point of initial discovery. That may be so in some cases. But in the 
case of nuclear physics, at least, the potential for vast destructive 
power, and the political implications of that power, was realized 
almost immediately upon the discovery of nuclear fission.60
Once we recognize science as essentially power of control and 
also acknowledge the ontological ambiguity of human existence—
that we are both subject and object, actor and patient, mind and 
58. Francis S. Collins, who developed the genetic test for cystic fibrosis and led the 
Human Genome Project in the United States, has indicated sensitivity to the ethi-
cal dilemma posed by diagnostic capability without therapeutic capability—see The 
Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (New York: Free Press, 2006), 
241–42.
59. Richard H. Bube, “A Crisis of Conscience for Christians in Science,” Perspectives 
on Science and Christian Faith 41 (1989): 11–19.
60. See Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 71ff.
body—this philosophical critique can be taken a step further to 
bring ontology back to ethics. Because human persons are both 
observers of and participants in nature, every power of control 
gained over nature is power of control gained over human beings, 
their lives and welfare. Even if ostensibly undertaken “disinterest-
edly” as the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself, science is 
always already the potential for subverting humanity as an end, 
for converting the human person into an instrumental means to 
other ends, including knowledge itself. Thus, far from fulfilling 
the myth of ethical neutrality, science cannot escape the paradox 
of ethical ambiguity—that although science is a project of human 
freedom, it always already generates (the potential for) action 
against human dignity.61
The ontological analysis of science as power of control carries 
ethical implications for not only science but also philosophy of 
science. Social- constructivist antirealist philosophies of science 
interpret scientific theories—including theoretical physics—
as mere social phenomena, as free constructions constituted by 
human relations rather than as true or false representations of the 
world constrained by an external, independent physical reality. 
To scientists the realism/antirealism debate may seem a harm-
less verbal dispute among philosophers and sociologists. The real 
consequences of a social construct, however, are quite different 
than those of a true representation: The former confers at most 
the social power of prejudice, whereas the latter confers material 
power to control and destroy. A social- constructivist antirealist 
philosophy of science would thus lead to a very different appraisal 
61. See Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Citadel Press, 1976), 
99: “Thus one finds himself in the presence of the paradox that no action can be gener-
ated for man without its being immediately generated against men.”
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of scientific responsibility if the only weapons science could devise 
were categories of social prejudice. Of course, insofar as scientific 
theories do reflect and reinforce social prejudice and thereby le-
gitimate oppression, science is culpable; and sociological (as well 
as feminist) critiques of science are certainly helpful to the extent 
that they expose the sources and effects of such bias in science.62 
But is it not a serious offense to the memory of the victims at 
Hiroshima to say that all that theoretical physics contributed to 
their horrific deaths was a social construct? This raises the ques-
tion: Can there be an ethically responsible social- constructivist 
antirealist philosophy of science that does justice to the victims of 
science- enabled violence? In any case, the upshot here is that not 
only is a value- free (empiricist- positivist) epistemology of science 
premised upon a sharp fact/value dichotomy inadequate, but so 
also is a value- full (social- constructivist) epistemology that makes 
no fact/value distinction at all. For, as Hilary Putnam observes, 
while the fact/value dichotomy fails, there is nonetheless a genuine 
distinction to be maintained between fact and value even if there is 
an “entanglement” of fact and value in scientific knowledge.63
Science and Power: Theological Critique
Theology of Power
I have already noted the ways in which science is power. Science 
wields intellectual power of knowledge concerning nature’s capac-
ities as well as technical power of control over nature’s capacities. 
62. See Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1974), David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), and Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
63. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy.
It is also a social power that shapes cultural understandings, influ-
ences public policy decisions, and drives economic development. 
The institutionally structured and hierarchically organized profes-
sion of science is itself a cultural power analogous to government, 
military, and financial institutions and organizations.
The Apostle Paul’s language for the multifaceted “powers” that 
rule our world may be interpreted as naming the spiritual ethos of 
political, economic, and cultural systems and institutions.64 These 
powers are good because they were originally created by God; as 
part of the created order, however, they participate in the Fall 
of creation precipitated by sin and rebellion. Yet, insofar as they 
are created by God they are redeemable as part of the restoration 
of creation through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Hence, the three- fold judgment on the powers: the powers are 
good, the powers are fallen, the powers are being redeemed. The 
“domination system” through which fallen power functions in this 
world structures power in such a way as to favor the strong over 
the weak, the rich over the poor, the educated over the unedu-
cated, the ruler over the ruled, those with defense systems over 
those vulnerable to attack.65 Control, especially by way of coercion 
and violence, both psychological and physical, is the way of the 
domination system. The domination system, bent on control, is 
a rebellion against God’s Kingdom, which is a domination- free 
order (as manifest in the Magnificat and the Beatitudes).
64. I follow the line of interpretation by Hendrik Berkhof, Christ and the Powers 
(Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1977), John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), and Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). The term “powers,” which refers here to the col-
lection of Greek words used by Paul (exousiae, dunamis, stoichieia) is variously trans-
lated as “authorities,” “dominions,” “principalities” and “powers.”
65. “Domination system” is Wink’s interpretation of the biblical term kosmos, usually 
translated as “world.”
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Now, science is a cultural expression of what Aristotle called 
“the natural desire to know,” and the human knowing and tech-
nique as well as human organization involved in scientific prac-
tice are capacities created by God as much as they are in relation 
to other human activities. Thus, science as power—intellectual, 
technical, social, and institutional—participates in both the good-
ness of creation and the fallenness of creation, alongside the other 
fallen powers of our world. Because it is rooted in capacities origi-
nally created by God, science as multifaceted power is both good 
and redeemable, even though as fallen it holds potential for evil in 
our world. From a theological perspective, therefore, the myth of 
ethical neutrality is all the more a nonstarter because science par-
ticipates in the Fall of creation. Science, though not value- neutral, 
is not evil but ambiguous: Science is good, fallen, and redeemable, 
all at once.
Science as Fallen Power
Science, as both a social institution and a research endeavor, is 
caught up in multiple facets of the domination system. As a cul-
turally based social institution, science has been allied historically 
with the domination system linking race, gender, class, and ge-
ography that favors—politically and economically—white over 
nonwhite, male over female, elite over common, and north over 
south. This alliance between scientific power of control and so-
cial power of control has produced scientific theories (particularly 
concerning race and gender) that distort the reality of nature and 
betray the prejudices of the privileged.66 As a research endeavor, 
66. See Dava Sobel, Longitude (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), James D. Watson, 
The Double Helix (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), Stephen J. Gould, The 
Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1996), Daniel J. Kevles, In the 
Name of Eugenics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), and Evelyn 
by reason of its need for public- sector funding or private- sector 
patronage, a considerable constituency of science is caught up in 
the military- industrial complex, which links scientific research 
and arms manufacturers (typically subsidized by taxpayers through 
appropriations via the Departments of Defense and Energy) with 
U.S. foreign policy that often favors corrupt governments in de-
veloping countries, enriching arms manufacturers and propping 
up repressive rulers at the expense of both the basic welfare of the 
domestic poor and the human rights and democratic aspirations 
of the dispossessed and disenfranchised of the developing world.
This theological critique of science can be extended beyond the 
intersection of science with society. Understanding science as a 
form of power of control, and not simply as an abstract set of 
knowledge claims, and recognizing that the powers in our world 
are fallen open science to theological critique precisely at the hinge 
of the myth of ethical neutrality and the division of moral labor—
the utilitarian conception of science as a value- neutral means to 
independently validated ends. The Fall of creation implies that 
power, in whatever form or however used, is not value- neutral 
from the start but rather already participates in fallen structures 
via the domination system prior to our instrumental uses of power 
for human ends. Power of control, therefore, far from being an 
unequivocal good, is not even an innocent instrument corrupted 
only extrinsically by evil uses such that it is only the ends of ac-
tion that call for evaluation. Because power of control is fallen and 
thus already “bent” toward domination from the first moment we 
utilize it, it can never be considered in its mere instrumentality 
but is always in need of theological critique. Utilitarianism is thus 
Fox Keller and Helen Longino, eds., Feminism and Science (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996).
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a nonstarter: There can be no separate evaluation of means and 
ends, or justification of value- neutral scientific means by value- 
laden social ends, because the scientific means are already fallen 
and, hence, always potentially corruptive and destructive of the 
social ends. 
Because science is a power of control and thus participates in 
the Fall of creation, and because the fallenness of power lies be-
yond the competence of human technique to overcome it, science 
cannot “save” itself from the Fall by its own power. Even if science 
were conceived in utilitarian terms as a neutral means to human 
ends, therefore, it is always in need of justification on grounds 
that transcend the ostensible human ends it serves. Thus, the in-
strumental use of scientific means for social ends requires ethical 
justification on theological grounds over and above the epistemo-
logical criteria of scientific practice. Science that is successful in 
its own terms and by its own criteria, even science that ostensibly 
serves social ends, cannot be considered morally innocent; there 
are some things that science must not do, because there are some 
uses of power that are wrong, no matter how useful they might 
seem to human judgment. NOMA is thus a nonstarter: The sepa-
ration of science into a self- regulating domain free from theologi-
cal critique effectively assumes that successful science is morally 
innocent, which is precisely what cannot be assumed on account 
of the Fall.
If we now combine the ontological ambiguity of human exis-
tence with the fallenness of worldly power, we may argue: Because 
(a) human beings belong to the created order, (b) power within 
the created order is fallen, and (c) science as power is both enabled 
by the capacities of the created order and enables control over the 
created order, it follows that science is always already, though not 
irredeemably, implicated in the moral ambiguity of a fallen world. 
All human projects, science included, are undertaken in a fallen 
world—a world in which power is already structured by political, 
economic, and cultural forms in such a way that power of control 
functions with an “inertial” tendency favoring “haves” over “have- 
nots,” a tendency of power to accumulate power for its own sake 
that must be consciously recognized and actively resisted. Because 
in a fallen world all power of control is thus “warped” in favor of 
the strong over the weak, rich over poor, and so on, science, too, 
functions along a “gradient” toward the domination of humanity. 
Despite scientists’ best intentions of serving human ends by sci-
entific means, therefore, they cannot escape responsibility for the 
uses of scientific knowledge. Science, like all human activity in a 
fallen world, is in need of redemption even if it proves itself suc-
cessful in enhancing or enabling our control over nature. Indeed, 
because fallen power is structured in favor of domination, the very 
ideal of control, whether in science or politics, requires theological 
critique.
Responsible Science: A Christian- Critical Perspective
Christians and Christian institutions should not abandon the 
practice of science because of its fallen nature, as if we could escape 
the Fall by avoiding science. At the same time, without sacrificing 
the integrity of our faith, we cannot practice science as if it were 
exempt from the Fall. On account of the theological critique of 
science as fallen power, responsible science from a Christian per-
spective must be accountable not only to values that transcend the 
scientific pursuit (the common good) but also to values grounded 
in transcendent reality (God’s Kingdom). We might thus say that 
responsible science requires the “transvaluation” of science, the 
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evaluation and ordering of science according to transcendent val-
ues. To implement the transvaluation of science, Christians who 
practice science and Christian institutions that support scientific 
research ought to do so only within the boundary values of God’s 
Kingdom (human dignity and nonviolence) and should seek to 
orient science toward the inverted priorities of God’s Kingdom 
(good news for the poor). In Christian practice, responsible science 
thus entails: the renunciation of certain areas of scientific research; 
the ransoming of science from evil uses; and the reorientation of 
research priorities.
Science and the Kingdom
Whereas the myth of ethical neutrality locates science in the time-
less realm of Platonic ideas, the theological critique of science as 
fallen power properly locates it between the historical horizons of 
creation and redemption. The evaluation of scientific practice and 
the corresponding judgment of responsibility in science, therefore, 
ought not to be abstracted from eschatology, from the coming 
fulfillment of God’s Kingdom. From a Christian perspective, it is 
ultimately Kingdom values by which science, as means and end, 
must be judged. Within the eschatological horizons of beginning 
and end, there are two landmarks that indicate the divine pur-
pose in the created order—God’s creation of the world and God’s 
redemption of the world—and thus two “boundary values” that 
demarcate the ethical limits of human power: the dignity of the 
human person created in the image of God67 and the nonviolent 
67. By “dignity” I mean that the individual human person possesses a transcendent 
worth, a worth that is not founded upon either material value or human interest and 
that cannot under any circumstance be subordinated to human freedom of choice for 
the sake of expedience.
way of the cross by which God is redeeming “all things” through 
Christ’s victory over the fallen powers. As soon as we adopt 
Kingdom eschatology and look to Jesus as the Incarnation of the 
Kingdom, the one in whom Kingdom ends and worldly means 
are perfectly fitted, it becomes clear why powers of control are 
to be held in suspicion: No worldly power of control, no matter 
how benevolently exercised, not even when wielded by Jesus, can 
fulfill the Kingdom. Hence, just as Jesus resisted the temptation 
to temporal control by material power to establish the Kingdom, 
so also the human exercise of power must resist the temptation to 
domination through science.
This eschatological judgment begins with recognizing that the 
scientific pursuit is not an absolute value and, hence, that free-
dom of research is not an unconditional imperative. Responsi-
ble freedom, including the freedom of research, must serve ends 
transcending both freedom and science—the common good and, 
above all, God’s Kingdom. Moreover, one might define “God” 
operationally as “the source of one’s values and the center of one’s 
loyalties.” Thus, to insulate science from theological- ethical cri-
tique as a self- justifying project by declaring knowledge to be an 
end in itself and, hence, the source of an unimpeachable impera-
tive is, for the Christian, tantamount to idolatry, the setting up 
of a competing kingdom. As Niebuhr put it, “It does not seem 
entirely a figure of speech to say that sometimes for some of the 
devotees of science, if not for scientists themselves, the scientific 
method has become a god.”68 Instead, the Christian who practices 
and uses science responsibly must also be able to critique it from 
an eschatological perspective that encompasses and judges both 
68. Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, 85. Niebuhr characterizes such a view as a form of 
henotheism.
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the methods and aims of science according to Kingdom values. 
So, while responsible Christians need not abandon science, nei-
ther must they serve science as an absolute value and autonomous 
project.
Renunciation in Science
The first step in transvaluing science according to God’s King-
dom is to acknowledge that some scientific pursuits transgress the 
boundary values of human dignity and nonviolence and are thus 
“out of bounds.” Just as during his temptations and trials, Jesus 
renounced controlling, dominating, and violent forms of power 
because of their inherent incompatibility with God’s Kingdom, 
fidelity to God’s Kingdom requires renunciation where the sci-
entific means and ends are inherently incompatible with King-
dom values and goals. Not all powers are created (e.g., God’s own 
creative power) or were put under human responsibility for the 
sake of preparing the way of the Kingdom (e.g., the power of life 
and death). Therefore, the very exercise of, or even claim to, such 
power by human beings already indicates an evil—an unjust usur-
pation of God’s prerogative—such that there is no possible virtu-
ous exercise of such power.
So, it is no moral credit to us when on occasion we refrain from 
exercising a power that was not within our rightful claim in the 
first place; the only morally responsible action worthy of praise 
is the renunciation of claim to that power, not the prudent or re-
strained use thereof. For example, when SS Commandant Amon 
Goeth follows the advice of war profiteer Oskar Schindler to show 
restraint and (temporarily) “pardons” one of the Jewish prison-
ers in his slave labor camp rather than summarily executing him, 
his action does not express virtue, because the power to kill was 
not within his moral right to exercise to begin with; unless he re-
nounces claim to that power, his action expresses only further self- 
indulgence.69 The morally responsible exercise of power, scientific 
or otherwise, begins with the reverent humility that ancient He-
brew poets called “the fear of the Lord”—acknowledging that we 
are not God and thus have limited claims to legitimate power. The 
upshot for our purposes is this: Science in the service of a power 
that human beings have no moral right to exercise in the first place 
(namely, research complicit in undermining human dignity or en-
abling violence) is already an evil and ought to be renounced from 
the beginning, not merely restrained after its evil use. There thus 
are limitations to invoking Paul’s instruction to the Christians at 
Corinth as a guide for responsible scientific research—“ ‘Every-
thing is permissible,’ but not everything is beneficial. ‘Everything 
is permissible,’ but not everything is constructive.” (1 Cor 10:23)—
precisely because (as Paul himself would acknowledge) not every-
thing is permissible in the first place.
Taking into consideration the boundary value of the dignity 
of the human being created in the divine image leads us, first, 
to renounce science in the name of controlling domination over 
human life. Human cloning, for example, grasps at God’s sover-
eign creative power over life: It seeks to recreate the human being 
in human, rather than divine, image. It would effectively convert 
the human being created for serving God’s Kingdom into an in-
strument of human interests by shaping human biology in accord 
with human social, economic, and political values. Cloning would 
thus undermine human dignity by eroding the transcendent value 
69. Thomas Keneally, Schindler’s List: A Novel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 
212ff.
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of the human person. Even cloning a child for the ostensibly hu-
manitarian purpose of having a donor match to cure a rare disease 
would undermine human dignity: The clone would be conceived 
as a means to her sibling’s welfare. It would not express virtue for 
scientists to clone one human being and then show restraint either 
by refraining from doing so again or by refusing to divulge knowl-
edge of the technique or by seeking to have it banned by law. 
There is no way to undermine human dignity in moderation—the 
only morally responsible course of action is renunciation.
Another renunciation along similar lines should be made in 
the case of cryogenics. Cryogenics is an attempt to achieve victory 
over death—the indefinite prolongation of human life—by scien-
tific means. From the perspective of Christian eschatology, hope 
for conquering death is anchored in the promise of a glorified and 
incorruptible body made possible through the death and resur-
rection of Jesus Christ, not the technological manipulation of the 
natural and corruptible body. Thus, scientific innovation aimed at 
overcoming death via biotechnology cuts directly across Christian 
faith by anchoring hope in science—in nature- enhanced human 
power of control—rather than in God’s sovereignty over life and 
death as witnessed by resurrection. What Gilbert Meilaender 
writes concerning human experimentation in general applies as 
well to cryogenics research:
Placing our hope in the forward march of medical re-
search, we deceive ourselves into imagining that it could 
be redemptive, that it might overcome the sting of death. 
. . . But the march of progress within human history is not 
itself redemptive, and God ultimately deals with suffer-
ing in his own mysterious way. . . . Christians, therefore, 
have no good reason to [completely] renounce the cause of 
medical research, but our commitment to it ought to be a 
chastened one, liberated from the fear that makes an idol of 
our hopes.70
The scientific pursuit of cryogenic technology, in effect, denies the 
limits of our creaturely finitude and thus makes an idol of natural 
duration, substitutes natural duration for glorified life as our eter-
nal destiny.
Taking the boundary value of nonviolence into consideration, 
second, leads us to renounce science in the service of destruction. 
Nuclear weapons research (all weapons research, I would say) is 
inherently incompatible with the fulfillment of the Kingdom, in 
which swords are beaten into ploughshares, not vice versa. One 
might argue that nuclear weapons research could be subjected to 
an international political order that would restrain their produc-
tion and use within rational and just limits. Such a view, however, 
projects the wrong eschatology: Christian hope is anchored in 
Christ’s victory and his coming Kingdom, not in human rational-
ity or institutions (not even the United Nations). Regarding the 
atomic bomb, in particular, the only morally responsible action 
would have been to renounce the right to make such a weapon, not 
merely to make it and then, as advocated by a small group of sci-
entists in the Manhattan Project, transfer the right to use it to an 
international political body.71 The implication here is that finishing 
the atomic bomb, testing it, and then leaving responsibility for its 
use to an unwitting society was an act of extreme self- indulgence 
by (the majority of) the Los Alamos scientists, especially their 
leader, J. Robert Oppenheimer.
70. Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerd mans Publishing, 1996), 108–9.
71. I refer here to the famous “Franck Report,” reprinted in Jungk, 348–60.
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Renunciations along similar lines may also be called for con-
cerning some new classes of technologies because of their inherent 
destructive potential. Bill Joy, cofounder of Sun Microsystems, 
expresses deep concern over the emerging technologies of the 
twenty- first century—genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and 
robotics—each of which carries the possibility of self- replication, 
a potential for destruction even beyond that of nuclear weapons, 
raising the prospect of human extinction species via uncontrolled 
self- replicating technologies. After considering and rejecting ways 
of developing shields against such prospects as cures almost worse 
than the disease, Joy questions a scientific pursuit unbound by lim-
its and proposes that such research be restricted or even renounced 
altogether:
The only realistic alternative I see is relinquishment: to limit 
development of the technologies that are too dangerous, 
by limiting our pursuit of certain kinds of knowledge . . . 
if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge 
henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then 
common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, 
long- held beliefs. . . . It is this further danger that we now 
fully face—the consequences of our truth- seeking. The truth 
that science seeks can certainly be considered a dangerous 
substitute for God if it is likely to lead to our extinction.72
Joy’s concern echoes that of Niebuhr and Meilaender cited above: 
The latent danger in the scientific pursuit of self- replicating tech-
nology is not only degradation and destruction of humanity, but 
idolatry—the fabrication for ourselves of a power to replace God. 
72. Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired 8.04 (April 2000).
Joy thus calls for a humbler science, a pursuit restrained by con-
science and guided by wisdom, which in his view tell us to limit 
research: “It would seem worthwhile to question whether we 
need to take such a high risk of total destruction to gain yet more 
knowledge and yet more things; common sense says that there is 
a limit to our material needs—and that certain knowledge is too 
dangerous and is best forgone.”73
Extending the theological- ethical critique of power to scien-
tific means also points to the renunciation of certain experimen-
tal methods. The end of knowledge by itself cannot ever justify 
the scientific means used to acquire it. No matter how useful the 
knowledge that we seek is by human measures, the methods of sci-
ence still need to be critiqued according to Kingdom values beyond 
utilitarian and pragmatic criteria. Considering again the boundary 
values of human dignity and nonviolence, research methods that 
cause suffering or loss of life, restrict human freedom or degrade 
human life, or cause environmental destruction must be closely 
scrutinized and perhaps rejected.
Consider some examples. Experimental methods directly caus-
ing, or likely to cause, loss of human life must, of course, be re-
nounced outright. Because freedom is an essential facet of human 
dignity, experimenting on human subjects who have not given 
informed consent or who cannot understand the risks of the ex-
periment (e.g., children and the mentally handicapped), give con-
sent, or refuse it (e.g., prisoners or comatose patients) must also be 
strictly renounced. Without the right of informed consent, human 
subjects become nothing more than another laboratory instrument 
or material, a denial of their God- given dignity. Furthermore, 
any experimental situation subjecting human beings to degrading 
73. Ibid.
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conditions (e.g., humiliation, intentional infliction of pain for no 
other purpose or infliction of pain disproportionate to the purpose, 
or deprivation of basic needs such as food, water, shelter, or sleep) 
must be rejected even if informed consent has been obtained. For 
the Kingdom calls us to lift up the lowly, bind up wounds, and 
supply basic needs.
Ransom of Science
Beyond recognizing that scientific pursuit is not an absolute value 
but is accountable to transcendent values, such that some scientific 
means and ends must be renounced for the sake of the Kingdom, 
the transvaluation of science can point us toward the redemption 
of fallen science. From a Christian perspective, we should refrain 
from judging as intrinsically evil anything that God has created 
and intended for human responsibility. Not even nuclear physics, 
which has given us terrible weapons of mass destruction, is beyond 
redemption. In a fallen world, nonetheless, we might assess scien-
tific knowledge—in particular, science containing an inherently 
practical potential for mass destruction or undermining dignity—
an initial moral debt that any uses must repay to the benefit of 
humanity. To use a theological metaphor, such scientific knowl-
edge in a fallen world is in a state of “original sin” and cannot be 
redeemed by believing that, as Edward Teller put it, “knowledge 
in the end will be turned into blessing” by the goodness of human 
intentions.74 Teller’s faith is theologically adequate only if we as-
sume that God will bless whatever well- intentioned human be-
ings do in the name of knowledge. That such an assumption is 
false is precisely what the Fall is about in the first place. Instead, 
74. Teller, “Atomic Scientists Have Two Responsibilities,” 356.
such science must be “ransomed” by “sacrifice,” freed from captiv-
ity to evil by service for the good of humanity in the name of the 
Kingdom.
Because of the moral ambiguity in which science participates, 
the ransom of science that has destructive or degrading potential 
from original sin requires the continual evaluation of both means 
and ends for conformity to Kingdom values. Consider nuclear 
physics and human genetics. Both of these sciences, which have 
inherent potential for mass destruction and undermining dignity, 
not only inherit original sin but also have incurred an actual moral 
debt, due to the actual use of that potential in nuclear and eu-
genic holocaust. Thus, the very knowledge of nuclear fission/fu-
sion or of the human genome would already be in need of being 
ransomed, a debt only compounded by the atrocities of Hiroshima 
and Auschwitz.75
Regarding the ransom of nuclear physics, we must ask whether 
nonviolent applications that serve Kingdom values of peace and 
well- being—for example, civilian energy production and nuclear 
medicine—are paying the initial debt over and above the enormous 
liability incurred at Hiroshima and via the arms race, or whether 
these applications are only compounding the debt through prob-
lems such as nuclear waste. Regarding the ransom of human ge-
netics, we must ask whether good applications that serve Kingdom 
values of justice and healing—for example, exonerating via DNA 
testing those wrongly convicted and sentenced to death and ap-
plying cellular therapy for genetically linked diseases—are paying 
75. I use “Auschwitz” here to indicate the Nazi program of race “purification,” which 
was the apogee of eugenics in the twentieth century. Concerning the eugenic policies 
of Nazi Germany and their precedents in the United States, as well as the eugenic 
goals of the scientific study of human heredity, see Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics.
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the initial debt over and above the enormous liability incurred at 
Auschwitz, or whether such applications as genetic enhancement, 
genetic discrimination in insurance and employment, and embry-
onic stem- cell research are only compounding the debt.76
Could this redemptive process ever be finished by human ef-
fort? No. As long as the basic discovery and knowledge remain, so 
does the potential harm in a fallen world. Neither nuclear phys-
ics nor human genetics will be fully redeemed by human effort 
but will remain morally ambiguous, and thus in need of theologi-
cal critique, short of the final consummation of the Kingdom by 
Christ.
Reorientation of Science
Should we, recalling Hiroshima and Auschwitz, withdraw our 
trust in science and simply cease doing research? No. At the very 
76. It is assumed here, but not proved, that these latter applications negatively affect 
human dignity. The undermining of human dignity involves treating the human per-
son as having only instrumental value for human purposes rather than respecting the 
human person as having transcendent value in God’s Kingdom. In the case of cloning 
human embryos for stem cell research, for example, the threat to human dignity is 
quite direct. Embryos are first “manufactured” and then treated as “repositories” of 
“natural resources” to be “harvested” or “mined.” Once their usefulness is exhausted, 
they are “discarded” as “waste.” In other cases (e.g., genetic enhancement and discrim-
ination) the threat to human dignity is less direct and thus needs extended supporting 
argument. Concerning the legal and ethical implications of genetic enhancement and 
discrimination, see Roberta M. Berry, “From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic En-
hancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics 
& Public Policy 12 (1998): 401–48, and “The Human Genome Project and the End 
of Insurance,” University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 7 (1996): 205–56. 
Regarding the manifold social, ethical, and legal implications of genetic information, 
one will usefully consult Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood, eds., The Code of Codes: 
Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1992).
least, science and technology have enabled—one might even say, 
have become indispensable to—the Christian mission of justice to 
the poor, suffering, and oppressed; and this is a responsibility we 
should not abdicate, even (and especially) in a fallen world. The 
scientist Richard Bube, a Christian, echoes this point: 
Although there are certainly areas of human development 
where a simple cessation of activity is the informed response 
of Christians in science, it is clear that the general respon-
sibility of Christians and the Christian community to meet 
the needs of the people in the world cannot be met by ad-
vocating a simple end to all science. If, in fact, science did 
not exist, Christians would have to invent it in order to be 
faithful to their call to be stewards of the earth for God and 
their fellow human beings.77
If it is within our power to use science and technology to do justice 
for the poor, suffering, and oppressed, then we ought to do so, in-
sofar as our choice of science- enabled means upholds the dignity 
of the human person created in the image of God and conforms to 
the nonviolent way of Jesus.
The choice between a value- neutral science and a value- 
structured science is not available to us. Once we have recognized 
that science is not, nor could be, a value- neutral project, the key 
question for Christian responsibility thus becomes which values 
should structure scientific research. While living in the “mean-
time” between the horizon of original creation and the horizon of 
final redemption, and having set the moral limits of responsible 
77. Bube, “A Crisis of Conscience for Christians in Science.”
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science according to the boundary values of human dignity and 
nonviolence, we should further seek to reorient scientific research 
toward the inverted priorities of God’s Kingdom.
God’s Kingdom is an “upside- down” kingdom. The kingdoms 
of this world, structured by fallen power, favor strong over weak, 
rich over poor, “first” over “last.” In the Kingdom of God, how-
ever, the power ratios are inverted: The weak are lifted up from the 
dust, and the strong are pulled down from the thrones from which 
they have oppressed the weak; the poor are filled with good, and 
the rich who have filled themselves are sent away empty; those 
who have been put behind others are made first, and those who 
have put themselves before others are made last.78 This inverted 
ordering of Kingdom priorities has been dubbed the “preferential 
option for the poor” in Christian social ethics.
As we observed above, science as fallen power has often both 
reflected and reinforced the power priorities of worldly kingdoms. 
As Kingdom power overturns the perverted ordering of worldly 
priorities, so the transvaluation of science according to a prefer-
ential option would seek to reorient science toward the benefit of 
those who have been “put down,” “put out,” and “left behind” by 
fallen power. This would mean the redirection of research toward 
objectives such as: enhancing our capacity for food production for 
the world’s hungry; finding cures for “neglected diseases” that af-
flict the poor peoples of developing nations;79 designing appropri-
ate technologies for developing nations; and so on.
78. Donald B. Kraybill, The Upside- Down Kingdom, rev. ed. (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald 
Press, 1990).
79. Carlos M. Morel, “Neglected Diseases: Underfunded Research and Inadequate 
Health Interventions,” EMBO Report 4 Supp. (2003): S35–S38.
Consider here what might seem a scientific discipline far re-
moved from such concerns: cartography. The science of map- 
making seems value- neutral enough—it is simply about the 
objective representation of physical features of the terrestrial sur-
face, right? Not quite. For elementary geometrical reasons, the 
projection of a spherical surface onto a flat surface introduces 
distortions, such that every flat world map will have inaccura-
cies. But not every world map is inaccurate in the same way—the 
distortions depend on the mapmaker’s choices and thus, implic-
itly, on the mapmaker’s values. Picture in your mind the world 
map that most of us first encountered in middle school social 
studies class. This map, known as the Mercator Projection, has 
several limitations in accuracy, most obviously the extreme exag-
geration of land sizes near the poles (Canada, Greenland, Ant-
arctica, etc.). What is less obvious is the implicit bias of this map’s 
appearance: The distortion of land size increases as you move 
from the equator toward the poles, such that Europe and North 
America appear proportionally larger than equatorial Africa and 
South America. Now focus your mind’s eye to the center of the 
map. What’s there? Western Europe. Why is that? Because this 
sixteenth- century map was made for the purpose of guiding the 
navigation of European traders to tropical ports in service of the 
new mercantile strategy, by which European nations sought to 
augment domestic wealth and international power by military 
control of material resources in foreign locales, a strategy that 
provoked wars and promoted colonialism.
Although a significant advance in nautical cartography, the 
Mercator Projection not only reflects the geographical bias of 
its Flemish maker but also reinforces the assumed superiority of 
those whose interests it was designed to serve. And that, Denis 
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Wood argues, reveals how any map works: Maps serve interests 
that the map itself masks.80 Suppose, then, that we were to re-
orient cartography according to a preferential option—and thus 
choose a mathematical projection that, say, implicitly recognized 
the equal value of people living in the equatorial regions by rep-
resenting their land sizes in equal proportion to the land sizes of 
those living in Europe and North America. One map we might 
end up with is called the Gall- Peters Projection, which represents 
equal areas on the earth’s surface with equal areas on the world 
map, such that Africa is seen as much larger than Europe, which 
it actually is. The point here is not about choosing a perfect map; 
no map is perfect—the Gall- Peters Projection still seriously dis-
torts the polar regions. The point, rather, is that once we acknowl-
edge that there is no value- neutral map, the question is which 
values maps should serve. Having become conscious of the values 
implicit in all maps, Christian cartographers should seek to “un-
mask the power” of maps and design maps that not only represent 
terrestrial facts but also serve Kingdom goals. 
Even if we restructure science according to a preferential op-
tion, we must remain mindful of the ethical ambiguity of scien-
tific research: every scientific achievement in a fallen world, even 
science that is well- intentioned for human benefit, will have its 
shadow side. The reorientation of science will thus require a reas-
sessment of progress. Wendell Berry has aptly written:
Nobody seems to be able to subtract the negative results 
of scientific “advances” from the positive. . . . If science 
has sponsored both an immensity of knowledge and an 
80. Denis Wood, The Power of Maps (New York: The Guilford Press, 1992).
immensity of violence, what is the gain? . . . We need to 
require from our teachers, researchers, and leaders—and  
attempt for ourselves—a responsible accounting of techno-
logical progress.81
In effect, Berry is calling for a new type of history of science that 
observes a responsible accounting of progress, accounting for life 
lost and communities destroyed as well as knowledge gained and 
technique mastered. In economic metaphor, in good conscience 
we can no longer continue to “externalize” the actual human costs 
of scientific- technological progress. An example of responsible ac-
counting of scientific- technological progress is the recent report 
by the World Commission on Dams, which acknowledges that 
“dams have made an important and significant contribution to 
human development, but in too many cases, the social and envi-
ronmental costs have been unacceptable and often unnecessary.”82 
Take, for another example, genetically modified crops, over which 
there is considerable controversy. There is no question that ge-
netically modified plants have significantly enhanced the ability 
of subsistence farmers in developing nations to grow crops to feed 
their families. A responsible accounting of this scientific progress, 
however, would ask whether improvement in food production ca-
pability to match increases in world population does justice for 
the poor and hungry peoples in the developing world and liber-
ates them from cycles of famine and poverty exacerbated by civil 
war and political corruption, or whether such scientific progress 
81. Wendell Berry, Life Is a Miracle: An Essay against Modern Superstition (Washington, 
D.C.: Counterpoint, 2000), 70, 91,136.
82. “Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision- Making,” Final Re-
port, World Commission on Dams, November 2000, available at www.dams.org.
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serves to entrap them in a new form of global economic slavery to 
biotech companies in the developed world that enrich themselves 
at the expense of wild crop varieties, local agricultural techniques, 
and sustainable rural communities.83
To implement this reorientation of science, I propose that 
Christian universities that support scientific research adopt insti-
tutional practices that promote responsible science, such as the 
following. First, institutional review boards should require faculty 
research proposals and funding requests to address not only the 
apparent ethical questions concerning research methods, which 
has become standard practice, but also the potential social impacts 
of scientific research—and to do so prior to the commencement 
of research. Second, science departments should require faculty 
to compile regular reports not only of courses taught, papers pub-
lished, and dissertations directed, but also how their research re-
sults have been utilized by others and the actual social impact of 
that use. Third, faculty senates and academic deans should exercise 
a preferential option in their institutional practices of recognition 
(awards and honors) and advancement (promotion and tenure), 
giving preferential recognition and advancement to scientists 
whose research aligns with Kingdom priorities.
As we look beyond renunciation in science toward the ran-
som and reorientation of science for the sake of the Kingdom, we 
keep in view a constant theme: humanity and the world are not to 
be saved by any form or amount of worldly power of knowledge 
and control—political, financial, scientific, or otherwise. Thus, 
in seeking to transvalue science in accord with God’s Kingdom, 
83. See the alternative views of Jeff Stoltzfus and Marion Meyer, both with Menno-
nite Central Committee, in “Biotechnology: A Technology of Life or Death?” A Com-
mon Place 6 (November 2000): 8–11.
Kingdom eschatology limits us to a modest goal: not to save the 
world by the strength of our science, but to witness faithfully in 
the world to the Lord of the Kingdom through the right exercise 
of power via the responsible practice of science.
Responsible Science and Cross- Disciplinary Dialogue
The transvaluation of science in accord with the Kingdom values 
of human dignity and nonviolence requires that we bring science 
back into connection with those areas of human thinking and 
doing by which we receive and appropriate those values. Because 
it is only from the perspective of transcendence that all human 
persons acquire real dignity as creatures of God and that princi-
pled nonviolence finds its true motivation as an imitation of Jesus, 
responsible science must be accountable to the transcendent—the 
eternal and spiritual—as well as the temporal- spatial and material. 
This points us toward a constructive engagement of science with 
ethics, philosophy, and theology, disciplines that address them-
selves to the universalities of human value and cosmic existence.
To be responsible, moreover, science must not only be account-
able to the values “over its head,” as it were, but also acknowledge 
the values “beneath its feet.” This is the moral claim of propri-
ety, as Wendell Berry calls it, which raises several questions that 
“address themselves to all the disciplines, but . . . do not call for 
specialized answers.”84 To be responsible in any human endeavor, 
including science, we cannot act as if we do not inhabit a finite 
earth at a particular time and place. So, we must ask: What may 
we do with our abilities to serve our interest at this time that is 
respectful of our local place and appropriate to our actual condi-
84. Berry, Life Is a Miracle, 15.
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tion? To become aware of the question of propriety, science must 
be reawakened to the “life- world”—the lived reality of everyday 
experience in familiar surroundings—as the homeland of its think-
ing and doing, as the soil from which its activity, both theoreti-
cal and experimental, takes its start and in relation to which the 
very meaning of science as discovery of the real has its origin.85 
Thus, science must not only engage with ethics, philosophy, and 
theology but also converse with history, literature, and the arts, 
those human expressions that disclose the life- world in its mani-
fold particularities, revealing a world shot through with values that 
motivate our most basic existential commitments before scientific 
thinking even appears within human consciousness.
If science is to address both transcendence and the life- world, 
if science is to be both accountable to suprascientific universali-
ties and cognizant of prescientific particularities, dialogue across 
disciplines within the academy is essential. Berry reaches a similar 
conclusion: the inadequacy of science’s own professional standards 
to the task of assessing its progress responsibly, he writes, “is a 
sign of the incompleteness of science in itself—which is a sign of 
the need for a strenuous conversation among all the branches of 
learning.”86 This crossdisciplinary dialogue would, ideally, lead to 
a transformation of science education. It is no longer sufficient to 
leave students with the impression that scientific research is mor-
ally innocent insofar as and to the extent that it satisfies narrowly 
defined professional standards of competence and criteria of suc-
85. See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenom-
enology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970) and 
Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1962).
86. Berry, Life Is a Miracle, 145.
cess. Teaching scientific knowledge and technique confers power 
of control, but knowledge by itself is not wisdom, and technique is 
not virtue. To confer such power of control to our students with-
out appropriate moral guidance would be irresponsible in this age 
of unmitigated exploitation by the market and the military of any 
and every scientific- technological innovation with potential for 
increasing profits or killing people. Christian universities should 
thus adopt curriculum standards that require integrating the dis-
cussion of the social impact of science, the social responsibility 
of the scientist, and the ethical conduct of research into all levels 
of science education, from introductory undergraduate courses to 
advanced graduate studies.87
Summation
Throughout this essay, we have reflected on the question of val-
ues and responsibility in science along ethical, philosophical, and 
theological axes of analysis. We have seen from each angle that 
science is not, nor could be, a value- neutral project. Whether ana-
lyzed as the practice of a profession, as the pursuit of knowledge, 
or as a form of power, science is structured by values in both means 
and ends, both methods and goals. The only question for consid-
eration, therefore, is by which values science is to be structured. 
The overarching theme of the argument presented here is that we 
cannot in good faith assess the value and responsibility of science 
by demarcating it from other domains of human value and re-
sponsibility through a division of moral labor that leaves science 
responsible only for itself and answerable only to its own standards 
87. This proposal could be extended also to secular institutions; see Erin A. Cech, 
“Education: Embed Social Awareness in Science Curricula,” Nature 505 (2014): 477–
78 (January 23, 2014).
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of competence and criteria of success. Rather than allowing sci-
ence to be practiced independently within a specialized sphere 
of professional autonomy, science should be practiced within the 
encompassing sphere of Christian responsibility. We can exercise 
the power of science responsibly only when we do not cleave it 
from transcendent values.
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